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Financial Sector Liberalization and Challenges of Real Sector
Financing in Nigeria: The Wor1d Bank Perspective
Ismail Radwan•

eepenlng Nigeria's financial markets Is a key component of economic
diversification and Job creation. An efficient and functioning market for
credit will stimulate business activity and support Nigeria's dynamic
entrepreneurs. There is a prevalent feeling that following the banking sector crisis
which erupted in August 2009, this process has stalled as commercial banks have
curtailed their lending to the private sector causing a credit crunch or squeeze.

D

Our analysis Indicates that such a credit crunch has not taken place . Instead
banks have moved to clean up their loan portfolios, writing off bad loans that
fueled speculation in the stock market and the energy sector. Under increased
scrutiny from the CBN, commercial banks have tightened credit procedures and
improved reporting standards to reduce irregular practices such as related-party
and insider-lending. This process has been accompanied by a flight to quality as
banks switched from speculative assets to secure government papers and also
placed increasing liquidity in the interbank market - now guaranteed by the CBN.
As interest rates on government debt fell - yields on one year treasury bills
plummeted to 4 per cent - the pressure on the banks to seek more lucrative
earning assets has increased. Many banks are starting to focus on the emerging
SME loan market, where interest rates are a good deal higher. But most are
reluctant to enter a traditionally risky and difficult market. If government can
Improve the SME lending environment, activity In the sector will grow quickly.
The key threat to Increased SME lending Is the burgeoning fiscal deficit.
Government spending has climbed inexorably since 2006, while revenues have
been volatile. The excess c rude account has been depleted and government
has borrowed increasing amounts (largely financed from domestic sources) to
finance the shortfall. If these trends are not reversed the private sector will
continue to be crowded out, interest rates will rise and banks will continue to be
tempted to focus on buying government paper rather than starting to expand
lending to the real sector.

• Mr. Radwan is the Lead Economist. Financial and Private Development Network, African Region,
World Bank. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent
the views of the institution to which he is affiliated. the CBN or its Policies. This paper was written by
Ismail Radwan with inputs from Andrew Lovegrove (Consultant), Phebian Omanukwue (Consultant!
and Michael Fuchs (Adviser).
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In addition to ensuring fiscal discipline government can take steps to improve real
sector in Nigeria;
•

Improving creditor rights, credit information, collateral registries and fasttracking the completion of a national identity management system and
introducing commercial courts.

•

Building regulatory capacity so that the ongoing reform of the financial
sector is effective in managing risk rather than just a symbolic exercise.

•

Building capacity in the private sector through business development
services, managerial training and financial literacy programs.

•

Building capacity in the banking sector through downscaling programs to
introduce new techniques and products e.g. reverse factoring,
warehouse receipts and equipment leasing.

•

Quickly resolving the uncertainties surrounding the rescued banks and
AMCON.

•

Developing long-term options for housing finance and infrastructure
finance.

In doing so government must avoid the mistakes of the past; ending costly and
poorly targeted interest rate subsidies, avoiding directed credit and above all
ensuring sound supervision and regulation of the banking sector.

I.
Introduction: Real Sector Financing a Key Component of Job Creation
Nigeria has made tremendous progress in economic development over the last
ten years. Successive governments have achieved macroeconomic stability,
tamed inflation, secured a stable exchange rate and established fiscal
prudence. These achievements, along with the write-off of Nigeria's external
debt, have produced a period of long and steady economic growth. However,
this growth has not been met with a corresponding increase in the number of jobs
especially for Nigeria 's youth .
It is widely accepted that the private sector is the engine of growth. The creation
of an enabling environment will make it achievable. Three major challenges have
been identified as constraints to doing business in Nigeria; the lack of power, poor
roads and lack of access to finance as well as the cost of finance.
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Providing finance to Nigeria's real sector especially the small and medium
enterprises (SMEs) will be a key component of future job creation. Nigeria 's banks
have never successfully lent to the nation's SMEs. This paper reviews banks efforts
in providing financing to the real sector with a view to creating more jobs. It
provides recommendations on pro-active policy measures that the public sector
authorities can undertake to address the issue.
II.
The "Credit Crunch": Real or Imagined?
There is a widespread view in Nigeria that the recent banking sector crisis has
been followed by a credit crunch and that this has restricted access to finance in
the real sector. This section reviews the evidence starting from the banking sector
reforms that took place between 2004 and 2006.

Explosive credit growth 2006-2008
As a result of the consolidation of the banking system completed in 2005, Nigeria
witnessed increased growth in the banking sector. Banks expanded very rapidly,
raising large amounts of new capital and attracting large volumes of new
deposits. These were in tum deployed to fund enormous growth in the banks'
loan portfolios. By 2008, analysts of the Nigerian financial sector were becoming
increasingly concerned by the pace of credit growth given the weak
governance of Nigerian banks, outdated legal and regulatory frameworks, and
weakness of supervisory institutions.
During this review period, it was now recognize that much of the lending which
was then taking place was either:
(a)

margin loans; financing speculation in the stock market (often in the form
of investments in bank shares) ;

(b)

concentrated in the oil and gas sector without adequate credit
assessments or collateral;

(c)

fraudulent behavior such as related-party lending, insider-trading and
inaccurate reporting.

None of this lending was actually being channeled to productive uses in the real
sector or value-adding businesses; and it became apparent that a credit and
stock market bubble had formed by early 2008. In January 2008, the World Bank
undertook an analysis that indicated that the Nigerian stock market had the
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second highest price-earnings ratio of any stock market in the world. The report
a lso underscored the weaknesses in the banks portfolios exacerba ted by poor
supervisory practices and weak accounting systems. During the review period,
the global financial crisis, the stock market meltdown and the collapse in oil
prices resulted in huge default rates in Nig eria 's banks.
Figure 1: A Credit Bubble Develops 2006 - 2009

Growth in (nominal) credit to the private sector (y/y)
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The CSN reins In the banking sector's excesses
As a result of the special inspections carried out by the Central Bank of Nigeria
(CBN) in mid-2009, the extent of the build-up of risk - and the inaccuracy of
financial reporting - in the banking system became apparent. Eight banks were
intervened in and "rescued" w ith convertible loans from the CBN, which
simultaneously took measures to guarantee all interbank transactions, and
replaced senior management and executive directors. These eight banks have
not only depleted their capital but together accounted for further losses
estimated to be in the order of Wl.4 trillion (US$9.3 billion). In addition, even the
stronger banks that passed the CBN's stress testing have a lso had to write-down
bad loans and dramatically increase provisioning.
Since mid-2009 the CBN has implemented or announced a suite of measures
designed to improve regulation, governance, and transparency in the banking
sector, such as a common year-end fo r fina ncial reporting, implementa tion of
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) , abandonment of the universal
banking model and introduction o f financial holding companies, and restrictions
on the terms of executive and non-executive directors. In parallel, the Securities
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and Exchange Commission has moved to clean up the securities industry by
suspending and prosecuting firms and individuals and by restructuring the
management and governance of the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE).
Lastly, the National Assembly recently approved the establishment of the Asset
Management Corporation of Nigeria (AMCON), which will purchase toxic assets
from banks and/or recapitalize distressed banks where this is required to support
their sale to new investors. By relieving banks of the management burden of
dealing with distressed assets, and by cleaning up their balance sheets sufficiently
to allow them to raise new capital. AMCON has the potential to encourage
renewed credit growth. The possible entry of strong strategic partners through
acquisition of the distressed banks also offers an important opportunity to inject
the skills and technology required to prudently expand lending.
However. several key aspects of AMCON ' s operations remain to be defined:
•

The formula determining the price at which AMCON will purchase assets
from banks must be set in a way which carefully balances providing a fair
value for assets against a too-generous formula which allows banks to
"dump" assets on the taxpayer, potentially transferring value from the
taxpayer to shareholders. A correctly set price should, thus, inflict some
pain on banks selling assets to AMCON, but not so much that banks do
not use the facility. A price which gives AMCON some reasonable
probability of recovering the amount paid to a bank for assets - but not of
making a significant profit -would be the optimum.

•

The CBN is concerned about the problem of how to deal with small
shareholders of the banks - whom it can be argued were simply victims of
widespread fraud which the authorities failed to prevent. Dealing w ith
such an issue is extremely difficult. Considerable public resentment can be
expected if the banks' shareholders are "bailed out" by AMCON. It is vital
that shareholders do not receive compensation - if they do, serious moral
hazard would be created and a large measure of the beneficial effects
of the shock recently delivered to bank management and shareholder
(improving governance) would be lost. In this context, it is important that
the CBN focuses on improving the regulation and supervision of banks to
ensure that shareholders and depositors are well protected in the future.
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Figttrl' 2 : A Flight to Qua lit~ Take, Phtrl·
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A flight to quality by lenders and borrowers

Following the CBN 's special inspections, the banking sector "went into shock"
and a general flight to quality took place: on the part of depositors to the largest
and best managed banks which had survived the mid-2009 inspections, and on
the part of banks to cease lending and redeploy their funds into government
securities and the inter-bank market. As a result, by early 201 O. banks began to
rapidly accumulate liquidity, and treasury bills rates plummeted, with the
interbank call rate falling to 1.1 per cent and 1 year Treasury bill to 4.2 per cent by
mid-August 2010, from 4.5 per cent and 20.4 per cent, respectively, a year earlier.
Has credit been squeezed?

Within such an environment one might expect to see a tremendous contraction
in credit to the private sector. Indeed, there have been complaints in the
Nigerian media that the real sector faces an unprecedented credit squeeze as a
result of banks' withdrawal from lending, with attendant negative consequences
for growth and employment. However, these complaints need to be assessed
with caution. Analysis indicates that while total credit did contract in the first five
months of 2010, this contraction (overall 9.5 per cent) was highly concentrated in
a single category "Others" which contracted by more than 15.0 per cent. At the
height of the boom, this category accounted for more than 30.0 per cent of bank
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lending and is believed to be primarily share-purchase margin loans. The
contraction in this category is, therefore, predominantly the result of banks taking
provisions and write-offs against margin loans in recognition of the diminished
value of the under1ying share collateral.
Figure 3 : Credit ls still growing In most sectors
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The real sector appears to be unaffected

While total credit to the private sector
(Figure 4) flattened in nominal terms in
the early months of 2010, lending to the
real sector1 continued to increase in
nominal terms - indicating that it
remained flat in real terms - and over
the longer period of January 2009
through May 2010 has in fact increased
in both real and nominal terms. Credit to
the financial sector also increased
deployment
of
reflecting
banks'
increased liquidity into the interbank
market and more recently in solid
minerals sub-sector.

Figun· 4: Credit has not been s<1ut•cr(•d
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the aggregate has not experienc ed a credit crunch of any magnitude, although
lending to manufacturing and commerce, both important areas for job creation
has contracted. The CBN has taken steps to cushion the potential fallout from this
development.

Figure 5: The Real Sector is Largely Unaffected
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Disc ussions with bankers reinforce the conclusion that real sector credit has
always been highly concentrated in approximately 60 large, "blue chip",
Nigerian and multinational firms and the post-crisis banking system has returned
to its traditional focus on these firms . To the degree that credit standards have
tightened , the "losers" have been small and medium enterprise (SMEs)
" entrepreneurs" in commerce and manufacturing, who were able to secure
credit during the boom years from banks. Following the special audits, as the
banks reigned in their excessive lending, they also withdrew credit lines to these
SMEs in the process. Indeed, were the provisions taken against loans to such
borrowers from August 2009 to May 2010 period, which was excluded from the
analysis, the expansion of credit to blue chip firms would likely be shown to have
continued at its usual annual rate.
Is real sector lending being "crowded out"?

The incentive for banks to expand their lending to the real sector is driven by the
c urrent pressure on their earning capacity, particularly the recent quite dramatic
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drop in money market and g overnment security interest rates - i.e. the interest
earned on alternative 'safer' assets (Figure 2). Experience suggests that Nigerian
banks are keener to invest in safer assets and avoid the risks associated with
expanding their loan books. This behavior is likely accentuated both due to
current political uncertainties and the recent write-offs they have experienced,
even though the latter were not a result of real sector loans going into default.
Unfortunately, the process of crowding out is already very much in evidence.
Maintaining the balance of incentives to the advantage of encouraging banks
to increase their lending to the real sector will be a major challenge in the
coming months. As shown in Figure 6, Government oil revenues declined
considerably in 2009 while government expenditure has continued to climb
inexorably higher. Government filled its financing gap through the increased
issuance of treasury securities. This has led to a situation where total debt
outstanding has gradually risen. As most of this debt is financed domestically, it
has started to crowd out the private sector.
Figure 5 : Trends In Federal Govt. Expenditure, Revenue and Government Debt
Stock (N'Billlon)
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Following the bank consolidation process, banks rapidly expanded both their
lending to the private sector and their holdings of Government securities in 2007
and through most of 2008. Subsequently, loan growth has flattened, but of more
concern is that banks are already rapidly accumulating Government securities
(Figure 6). Unless the Government can rein in its deficit and , thereby, contain its
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reliance on treasury securities as a source of funding, there is every reason to
expect that the Government will be obliged to pay higher interest rates on
treasury securities and the banks will once again prefer the secure returns on such
securities rather than develop skills to enable them to expand responsible lending
to the real sector.
Based on the above analysis we come to the conclusion that there has not been
a sizeable reduction in credit to the private sector. Commercial banks have
reacted predictably to changing market conditions and increased scrutiny on
the part of the regulator. Non-performing loans are being purged from the
system and banks are replacing some of their disastrous margin loans with
sounder support for communications, construction and solid minerals. Nigerian
banks are also placing excess liquidity with the central bank as well as the
interbank market (which remains guaranteed by the central bank). However, as
rates on these assets have plummeted dramatically over the last year, this
strategy is unsustainable, if banks are to maintain positive returns for the
shareholders. Thus, going forward banks will be forced to build their loan books in
order to remain viable and profitable.
Figure 6 : Growth In DMBs core private sector credit and holdings of Domestic
Debt 21 ( per cent)
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Of overriding importance is that the Government maintains a very close watch
on its fiscal deficit. Should the deficit continue to grow, the Government will be
obliged to revert to increased borrowing leading to increased issuance of
21

Growth is measured over preceding December stock levels.
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Government securities and upward pressure on domestic interest rates (Figure 6) .
Rather than lending to private sector clients, whom they perceive as risky, banks
will prefer to purchase Government securities and lending to SMEs will diminish.
Within this context, it is important that the future expansion of the asset side of the
banks' balance sheets in the future takes place in a prudent manner in order to
sustain the long run expansion of the real sector of the economy. The following
section presents a framework on the strategy and some suggestions that
policymakers can consider for implementation to improve the situation.

Ill.
Sustainable and productive expansion of real sector financing
Capital is a vital input to any business. However, for most of the years analysed
the real sector is starved of formal sector credit. Of the more than 80.0 per cent
of businesses that wants to access a bank loan, only 1.0 per cent is successful
(see Figure 7). These figures are in stark contrast to more dynamic economies
suc h as China, India and Indonesia where more than a fifth of businesses are able
to sec ure bank loans and India and South Africa where more than one-third can.
The situation is especially dire for Nigeria's SMEs and informal businesses (Figure 8).
Figure 7 : Nigerian businesses do not have access to formal sector credit
Sources of short term finance for Nigerian formal sector businesses

Suppliens credit and
act.ences from
customers
25%

ot-

B anks and
financial kistitutions
1%

Even Nigeria's large formal sector businesses find it difficult to access finance and
the cost of finance. Those that can access loans are limited to loans of 21 months
average duration while many competitor countries can access loans of two or
three times the duration (Table 1).
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Tobie 1: Cost of Debt and Duration In International Comparison
Nigeria
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Figure 8: SM Es face the larg~st hurdles
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Nigeria's smaller businesses face particular hurdles to accessing finance. They
are not able to access loans, they cannot easily raise a mortgage on their
housing or land to finance their enterprises nor do they have access to reliable
and adequate infrastructure to produce goods and get them to the market.
These are the priority areas to address in order to expand real sector financing in
Nigeria:
•

Expanding access to credit for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs);
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•

Increasing the housing finance market; and

•

Expanding the supply of medium- and long-term credit for both businesses
and private participation in infrastructure investment.

For each of these issues, a summary of constraining factors is provided below
along with an analysis of the measures that have already been undertaken by
the government and recommendations for measures which would increase the
supply of credit. In many of these areas, far more detailed analysis and
recommendations have previously been prepared by the World Bank in the
course of its support for FSS 2020, and are appropriately referred.
Access to credit for SMEs
Following years of losing international competitiveness, the Nigerian SME sector is
fragile, operating in a business environment that presents considerable
challenges (e.g. poor infrastructure, low skills and weak regulatory environment).
This caused the overall share of SME contribution to GDP growth to halve (from
8.4 per cent to 4.6 per cent) between 1980 and 2005. 3 The SME sector in Nigeria is
much smaller than in other developing countries, with MSMEs (including
microenterprises) accounting for close to 50.0 per cent of GDP (compared to
80.0 per cent for many developing countries) , (National Bureau of Statistics).
Manufacturing as a whole is estimated to account for less than 5.0 per cent of
GDP, with SMEs accounting for half of this.

,-

Why Don't Banks Lend to SMEs?
There is a consensus within the banking sector regarding the constraints on SME
access to credit. These constraints fall into three broad categories: (a)
infrastructure constraints, (b) supply-side constraints, which relate to the incentives
for banks to lend to SMEs; and (c) environmental constraints, which reflect the
combination of institutional, legal, infrastructure, and capacity problems which
make SME lending cumbersome and risky:

•

3

Infrastructure constraints: Nigerian businesses claim that they are forced
to produce their own power, water and sometimes roads as well as
providing security for their businesses. This is confirmed by a recent World
Bank survey that revealed that 99.0 per cent of Nigeria businesses owned
their own generators. Given the enormous costs of providing such basic
amenities, SMEs struggle to compete with cheap imports or finds it difficult
to offer services at a cost that is affordable to the consumer. Bank
Malik, A. and F. Teal. "Towards a M ore Competitive Manu fac turing Sector", in C ollier. e t ol. 2008.
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managers support this analysis and are. therefore. reluctant to lend to
SMEs or have trouble in finding viable SME investment opportunities.
Although this is a key constraint, analysis of infrastructure weaknesses are
beyond the scope of this paper.

•

Nigerian banks have historically enjoyed very
high net interest margins as a result of four main factors. These are poor
fiscal management resulting in high rates paid on government securities;
high demand for credit for speculation in the years 2006 to 2008; high
interbank rates as a result of liquidity pressures on poorly-managed banks
with large volumes of non-performing assets; and, the shortage of
competing non-bank savings products (such as money market funds) to
put upward pressure on bank deposit rates. As a result, banks were able
to charge high real rates of interest while paying most depositors negative
real rates. Well-managed banks have thereby been able to earn high
rates of return without actively seeking to downscale their lending
activities: the risk-adjusted marginal profitability of SME lending has been
negative relative to lending to other banks, lending to blue chip firms. or
lending to the government and, accordingly, banks have not
experienced any incentive to make the investments required to build
capacity to lend to SMEs.

•

Envlronmental constraints: The environmental constraints on lending to
SMEs are numerous and require deep-seated reforms to address. These
include a very weak creditor rights regime, where debts require a timeconsuming and expensive process to secure, and even then provide only
limited certainty of enforcement; a lack of credit information on which to
base credit decisions due to the only nascent operation of credit bureaux
and lack of a functioning national identity system; dysfunctional and
manually-operated collateral registries; and widespread irregularities in
the police and judiciary, exposing lenders to an unreliable court system
during debt enforcement. In combination, these factors create a high
cost/high risk environment for SME lending, driving down its risk-adjusted
marginal profitability and making it unattractive relative to other credit
activities. The environment is made more risky by difficulties in extending
and collecting trade credit which drive up working capital requirements
and restrict sales growth, and the problem of securing title to real estate
assets, limiting the ability of SMEs to provide bankable collateral.

Supply-side constraints:
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Why Don't SMEs Borrow from Banks?
Many Nigerian businesses that require credit do not apply for bank loans and rely
instead on their own internal resources thereby drastically limiting their growth
potential. They offer four reasons for not applying for loans; (i) short maturities, (ii)
high interest rates, (iii) inaccessible collateral requirements, and (iv) cumbersome
loan procedures.• However, even within this environment banks have found ways
of overcoming these constraints making it attractive to move down market by
changing the business model and adopting new techniques such as those
championed effectively by one Nigerian bank (Box 1).
Previous Attempts at Addressing the Problem
Nigerian authorities have long struggled with the problem of how to expand
credit to SMEs. A few notable schemes have been piloted largely with poor
results. They are explained briefly as follows:
•

NACRDB: The Nigerian Agricultural Cooperative and Rural Development
Bank emerged from a merger between various public sector forerunner
banks. It is focused on lending to SMEs in the agricultural space. The bank
is hampered by inadequate governance structure, insufficient emphasis
on selection of clients, poor loan recovery, concentration on government
structures and partnerships, and inadequate range of products. The bank
loans are seen as part of the national cake and are rarely repaid (70.0 per
cent non-performing loan portfolio) which has further weakened the
credit culture in rural areas. The bloated branch network and staffing
results in a situation where the overhead costs represent 150 per cent of
net new lending. The capped interest rate (8.0 per cent) has led to the
bank making structural losses which have eventually led to its effective
bankruptcy.s

•

SMEEIS fund: The Small and Medium Enterprises Equity Investment Scheme
was launched in 2001 . It mandated commercial banks to set aside 10.0
per cent of their pre-tax profits to be invested in SMEs. As the banks were
not consulted prior to the launch of the scheme and had neither the
appetite nor the know-how to take equity stakes, most investments
yielded a poor return. The CBN failed to sufficiently monitor the scheme
closely and the banks gradually and quietly abandoned the scheme long
before it was officially closed down.

4

World Bank Investment Climate Assessment 2009.
A complete analysis of NACRDB including a menu of reform options and a governance review was
concluded by the World Bank and presented to the Federal Ministries of Finance and Agriculture in
2009.
5
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•

CBN Agricultural Fund: This scheme guarantees up to 87.5 per cent of
banks' lending to the agricultural sector (75.0 per cent guarantee plus
another 12.5 per cent based on surrender of collateral in the form of
government deposits). The guarantee has since 2005 been combined
with an interest rate rebate of 40.0 per cent for those borrowers servicing
their loans on time. However, despite these assurances, banks have only
developed limited appetite for lending to this risk-prone sector.

•

CBN SME guarantee facility: The CBN has been running an SME guarantee

Box 1 · A Nigerian Bank Successfully Grows its SME Business In the Toughest Climate

Unlike its competitors, one Nigerian bank has aggressively sought to capture a large share of the
SME credit market. As its large corporate customers paid down their debts and as the bank sought
to limit its exposure to single obligors, the bank was forced to look for new markets. The SME
market seemed like an enticing opportunity but the bank had neither the systems nor the knowhow to tackle the market successfully and like many Nigerian banks already had a checkered
history of previous attempts to grow this market segment.
Bringing in international expertise the bank launched new products and value propositions for its
customers. Firstly, it scrapped its Commission on Turnover (COD which effectively penalized its
customers for growing their deposit accounts. Charging a tiered, fixed rate for banking its SME
customers (capped at :w<i,000 per month) quickly resulted in a rapid growth of the bank's SME
liabilities.
The bank then introduced a peripatetic system of quarterly seminars where SMEs gathered
together to hear various success stories and gain valuable information and expertise from SME
bankers and other businesses. The bank introduced an "entrepreneur' s guide book" along with a
business club where SMEs could network and develop valuable business relationships. The bank
also prospered from the introduction of new clients. The bank sought term facilities from
international partners able to provide it with long-term finance at a reasonable cost along with
technical assistance support for venturing into non-traditional areas such as agriculture and health
care. This allows the bank to provide SME loans with maturities ofup to 4 years.
The bank launched an unsecured credit card, building its collections team in the process to ensure
that recoveries exceeded planned targets. The SME loans and credit cards proved to be a
profitable and quickly growing business segment. To address it, the bank had to introduce new
infrastructure and develop new skills for credit, risk management and recoveries. The bank had to
be creative in its approach to the market to overcome the existing deficiencies in the local market,
the poor physical address system (for client identification) and known weaknesses in the credit
information system. However, it has successfully grown the business and proved that Nigeria's
SMEs are credit worthy. The bank is facilitating the growth of Nigeria's most dynamic and
innovative small and medium sized companies. And until the time that other commercial banks
decide to follow suit they are operating without competition.
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facility for some years. The scheme allows participating banks to share
the credit risk for SME loans with the CBN. However, the banks are not
keen to participate. When a loan does go into default, the CBN insists
that the banks prove that they are taking action to recover the loan. As
such recovery procedures often take several years in court, the current
set-up does not encourage banks to make further SME loans.
•

CBN Microfinance fund: In January 2008, the CBN announced a
microfinance fund of WS0 billion. The CBN also announced that state
governments would set aside l .0 per cent of their budgets to support
microfinance. It was not clear whether the state governments had the
capacity to establish commercial microfinance organizations and it was
not clear where the remainder of the funds would come from. In
practice, the scheme never materialized.

A brief review of the various schemes launched in this area indicates that the
Nigerian public sector does not have a comparative advantage in the provision
of financial services. The theory behind the schemes has often been flawed, e.g.
capped interest rates, taxes on commercial banks or state governments.
Schemes that appeared promising on paper often ran into hitches once
implemented. The schemes are usually not discussed with the stakeholders. Most
government schemes have wasted scarce public resources.
In the case of guarantees, the level of guarantees - considerably in excess of the
internationally-recommended norm of equal 50/50 risk-sharing - has further
weakened the credit culture. Capping the level of government guarantees at
around 50.0 per cent is important so as to provide incentives for banks to assess
credit risk and to collect on delinquent loans. Where the level of guarantee is too
high. the cost of collecting on delinquent credits quickly rises to exceed the value
of the banks' exposures. The World Bank Doing Business Indicators suggest that
the average cost of recovering a delinquent loan in Nigeria is 22.0 per cent of the
loan amount. If banks are offered an 80.0 per cent guarantee and can only
expect to recover 78.0 per cent of a delinquent, they simply will not attempt to
recover the loan and the guarantee scheme will result in a huge number of
defaulted loans being transferred from the balance sheets of the commercial
banks to the CBN or Federal Ministry of Finance.
Most importantly, the schemes have never been actively monitored or evaluated
to determine their strengths and weaknesses and, therefore, the lessons of failed
attempts have never been captured or internalized before embarking on the
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next scheme. This has resulted in policy failures. Adopting a more open and
consultative approach to policy-making would help to avoid such policy pitfalls.
Supply-Side Constraints: Market-Driven Changes Should Promote SME Credit
Expansion
Other countries (such as Kenya and the former communist states of Central and
Eastern Europe) have seen rapid expansions in SME lending despite severe
business and credit environment problems. The drivers of credit expansion to the
real sector in these countries have been threefold:
i.

Restructuring of the banking system to remove liquidity pressures caused
by insolvent banks and introduce strong competition between banks
(often driven by the entry of foreign banks with technical capacities and
products required to downscale lending);

ii.

Maintaining sound fiscal policies to prevent the crowding out of private
sector borrowers and ensuring that the marginal profitability of lending to
the government remains below that of lending to the private sector; and,

iii.

The commitment of respective governments to credit and business
environment reforms building confidence that banks investing in
downscaling would see a steady improvement in the overall business
environment.

Current trends in Nigerian interest rates point to the emergence of an
environment where, if fiscal discipline is maintained, banks will face markedly
reduced profitability in 2010 and the probability of operating losses - or at best
very weak profits - in 2011 and future unless their portfolios can be redeployed
from g overnment securities and interbank lending into higher earning assets such
as loans.
The short tenor of most corporate loans will also increase pressure on banks' net
interest margins by allowing borrowers to negotiate rates downward in the shortterm rather than being locked in to high rates, while already very low deposit
rates severely limit banks' ability to maintain spreads by reducing their cost of
funds. Further to these factors, the resolution of the eight distressed banks should
support a signific ant increase in competition in the banking sector: as in other
countries, if these banks are sold to strong strategic investors, the infusion of
capital, tec hnology and capacity suc h investors c an provide should sharply
intensify competition within the system and, thus, force the pace of downscaling.
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The CBN is also moving to increase the supply of SME finance by establishing a
W200 billion SME loan guarantee fund. The fund would provide a credit guarantee
of 80.0 per cent of principal (meaning up to W240 billion of loans could be
covered) for loans to SMEs with 11 to 300 employees and assets - excluding land
- of less than WSOO million. The maximum loan size would be WlOO million. The CBN
has designed the facility so that guarantees will be paid as soon as a loan
becomes non-performing according to the CBN prudential regulations, which
responds to banks' reluctance to use the existing guarantee facility due to long
delays in receiving the proceeds from the guarantees.
The World Bank believes that the facility is well designed but that a lower level of
guarantee should be applied - also allowing greater leverage from the
guarantee commitment - in order to provide banks with a greater incentive to
monitor and recover guaranteed loans. A level of up to 50.0 per cent is more
consistent with successful guarantee schemes operating in other countries.
Increasing Competition also Poses Significant Risks
The potential for rapid transformation in banks' business models as a result of
shrinking margins on banks' traditional activities and the emergence of increased
competition from strategic investors creates a significant probability that there will
be a rapid build-up in risk within the system, with potentially severe
consequences. The primary risk faced by the banking system could emerge from
bank's moving aggressively into new types of lending as they are forced to seek
higher yielding assets: analysts (and many bankers) agree that the banking
system lacks the credit and risk management skills required for prudent SME
lending on any scale, and given the environmental risks which are an unusually
large factor in Nigeria, the possibility of large losses being incurred is high.

While a suite of measures to improve financial sector supervision and regulation
have been announced, it is not clear that supervisory institutions have themselves
built the capacity to effectively enforce the new regulations (a number of banks
raised this concern in meetings with the World Bank). In cooperation with donors,
the authorities have designed a comprehensive financial sector capacity
building program to address this problem, and start addressing other problems
relating to the lending environment, but implementation has been stalled since
early 2010. This situation sends a strong signal to the market that the authorities
are not really serious about addressing the problems in the banking and securities
markets which led to the 2009 crisis and is likely to undermine the willingness of
banks to downscale lending if there is no real prospect of any improvement in the
environment. Similarly, foreign investors and lenders are likely to remain extremely
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wary of Nigerian debt and equity offerings (both of which will be needed for
infrastructure and other real sector developments) so long as the supervisory
framework remains short of the capacity to enforce international standards of
transparency and financial reporting.
In a similar vein it will be important that the authorities move expeditiously and
effectively in resolving the situation o f the eight banks currently b enefiting from
the liquidity support of the CBN and CBN's b lanket guarantee of all interbank
exposures. It is, indeed, encouraging that the legal framework for the Asset
Management Corporation of Nigeria (AMCON) is now in pla ce. For exa mple, the
authorities will need to deal effectively with the unjustified court challenges being
mounted by disgruntled shareholders, in establishing even-handed criteria for
setting prices for assets to be assumed by AMCON, and in moving expeditiously
to determine which among the eight banks are to be liquidated (passing these to
NDIC) and which banks might be able to benefit from intervention by AMCON. 6
Some Suggestions1
A list of possible interventions designed to overcome some of the key obstacles
and challenges to SME finance is presented below.
•

Business development services (BOS): Pilot BOS progra ms in Nigeria
provided by government agencies like the SME Development Agency of
Nigeria (SMEDAN) and donor programs such a s the World Bank MSME
project have been successful in developing the effective demand for
credit.8 There is also increasing international evidence that providing BOS
programs alongside credit schemes results in far more successful
development of credit markets. BOS programs can be structured around
promising value-chains and matched with access to finance. The
programs would address some of the key issues on the demand side such
as the ability of SMEs to produce bankable business plans a nd overcome
cumbersome loan procedures.

•

Credit Information, Identification of borrowers and registration of movable
property: Despite recent progress on this front, more support is needed to

6

In March 2008, the World Bank completed analysis on the Banking Sector which highlighted the risks
of a potential banking sector crisis and made detailed recommendations on strengthening
accounting, reporting and disclosure which remain to be implemented. Following the crisis, the World
Bank produced a series of technical notes regarding the bank resolution process.
7 A detailed analysis of SME finance, Mlcrofinance and Mobile Banking was completed by the World
Bank and presented to government in June 2CX>8.
e A review of Business Development Services in Nigeria, BOO 2008.
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improve the regulatory framework, capacity, and equipment in this area.
For example, the credit information framework is inadequate in terms of
requirements as regards sharing of information so that it can be made
readily available to the competing credit bureaux as regards all bank
borrowers; the quality of the data available and the capacity of the
systems available are also in need of improvement. The development of
credit bureaux with a comprehensive information-set at their disposal is
essential for deepening of the credit markets. Importantly, this information
will allow banks to move away from bank lending based on collateral.
which is not readily available to many potential borrowers, is costly and
time-consuming to register, and also expensive to foreclose upon in case
of a borrower's default. Another major issue for providers of credit
information is the lack of a reliable national identity system. Government
also needs to push forward the timetable to implement a national identity
management system with biometric data as well as upgrading the
national street address system. The moveables registry also needs to be
strengthened. While the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) manages a
workable registry of floating claims on company assets, the registry does
not identify individual assets, and only incorporated businesses can make
use of it. Reforms are urgently needed to improve the registry and legal
system for liens on moveable assets.
•

Capacity bulldlng/technlcal support to strengthen the legal and
regulatory framework for SME financing: Based on a needs assessment to
be carried out, capacity building and technical support could be
provided for necessary reforms of the legal/regulatory framework to
support, inter alia, the leasing sector, finance companies, developing
commercial courts and/or alternative dispute resolution mechanisms etc.

•

Product/Scheme Innovation: The consultations held by the World Bank
with stakeholders in recent months have made it clear that
product/scheme innovation have stagnated in the country and there is a
need to draw on successful lessons learnt from other countries and
schemes run so far in Nigeria to come up with innovative ways to improve
access to finance. In this context, the following proposals are suggested:
a. Bank Downscaling Program: Nigeria's deposit money banks are not
used to lending to SMEs. Most do not have the required infrastructure
and human resources required for sound credit and risk management
policies needed to successfully serve this market. Technical Assistance
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programs along with guarantee schemes and/or credit lines would
serve to introduce new techniques proven in other countries to
address SME lending.
b. Credit Guarantee Scheme: A credit guarantee scheme such as that
currently administered by the CBN could play a role in encouraging
banks to develop and roll out SME products. It is important that the
mechanism is designed so as to rely on deposit money banks for the
assessment of credit risk and loan recovery, with the role of the
government agency being limited to funding and managing the
mechanism. As discussed above international best practice would
limit the guarantee to 50 per cent of the credit.

c. Credit Line: Through this mechanism a government agency would act
in the capacity of a wholesale institution, on-lending funds to a preselected group of deposit money banks. The participating banks in
turn would make sub-loans to SMEs, thereby, providing needed
working capital and investment finance, while taking on the credit risk
of their borrowers. This measure would effectively address the need
for medium-term financing while being coupled with needed
capacity building as regards bank down-scaling and BOS.
d. Reverse Factoring: A reverse factoring mechanism could be set up so
that large creditworthy firms participating in the program could invite
their suppliers to join their chain and post their receivables on line.
Participating financial institutions could bid to factor such receivables,
with suppliers choosing the best interest quote, while the factor is paid
when due by the buyer to the intermediary. The latter would on-lend
funds borrowed from a government agency that acts as the
wholesale funds provider.
e. Warehouse Receipt Financing: The CBN has expressed interest in
setting up a system whereby accredited warehouse operators would
store a range of graded commodities in exchange for receipts that
are transferable and would permit their owners to obtain credit using
them as collateral.

f.

Equipment Leasing: Aside from the support to be provided to
strengthen the regulatory and legal framework around leasing
activities, further support could be provided to set up a system of
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leasing schemes and registered stores to facilitate the leasing of
equipment for Nigerian SMEs.
Expanding Housing Finance 9

It is widely acknowledged that the Nigerian construction sector holds huge
potential tor the creation of millions of new jobs over the next decode. The
construction and real estate sector remains limited: it currently accounts for less
than 2.0 per cent of GDP. There ore on estimated 16 million units in terms of gap,
most of which ore needed in Logos and other large urban centers. This is largely
the result of the absence of housing finance. There are an estimated 40,000
mortgages in Nigeria, most of which ore held by bank employees. Developing a
housing finance market would not only allow this sector to take-off and achieve
its potential but it would also allow entrepreneurs to use their property as
collateral to raise low-cost, long-term loans that con then be used to finance
business ventures as in many other countries.
There are currently a number of constraints to the emergence of a functioning
housing finance market, the most significant of which is the time and cost token
to register property. The Land Use Act, 1978, vested the ownership of all land in
the Governor of each State. All transactions in property require the consent of
Governors and registration with land registries. The process is time-consuming
(toking six months or more) and very costly. The total fees have risen to 37.0 per
cent of the property value in Ondo state. In aggregate, Nigeria comes in lost
among 178 countries in the ease and cost of registering property. 10
Despite the unfavorable environment, there is a growing mortgage market in
Nigeria. Loans are provided by the retail deposit money banks and to a much
lesser extent by the primary mortgage institutions. Loons are financed by retail
deposits. The maturity mismatch is largely mitigated by the use of the adjustable
rate mortgage and loons rotes are typically being tied to banks' prime lending
rates. In most countries, a key element of the underwriting process is examining
the financial history of the borrower, particularly in respect of his record in
repaying other loans. Bonkers regard this as the single most important piece of
information that they need in order to underwrite loons effectively. In Nigeria, as
mentioned above, there are still serious issues hampering the effective operation
of the three licensed credit bureaux.

In March 2008, the Wor1d Bank provided a series of reports on housing finance to the CBN including;
(i) a detailed analysis of the Nigerian housing finance market, (tt) An analysis of opportunities for lowcost social housing and (in) a concept paper for a housing finance liquidity facility.
10 Wor1d Bank Doing Business Indicators 2010.
9
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Lenders require the borrower to have clear title for that property and will normally
take a legal mortgage, although in some cases they may use an equitable
mortgage. To further protect themselves lenders will normally deal with borrowers
only from certain specified employers - typically the public sector and large
corporations. Mortgage repayments are made by deduction from wages, and
there may also be some informal support from the employer.
The result of this situation is that most pieces of land are not registered: in Lagos
just 80,000 titles are registered whereas the number should be 4 - 5 million. The
main effect of the plethora of controls and taxes is that transactions either do not
happen or happen in the informal sector. Transactions in the formal sector are
costly and time-consuming, partly because of the efforts that are made to
mitigate risks associated with the lending environment. Ultimately, Nigeria's huge
real estate assets remain unleveraged and are unable to play a useful role in
promoting economic growth and creating new jobs.
Public Sector Attempts to Address the Situation

As in the case of support to SMEs, the public sector has piloted well-intentioned
attempts to improve the situation, but again with largely counter-productive
results. The most notable public schemes in housing finance include the
following:
•

The Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria (FMBN) administers the National

Housing Trust Fund (NHTF) provident scheme and also has other functions,
although at present it is not a mortgage bank. Like other public institutions
its bloated structure (including 8 zonal and 38 district offices) and limited
income sources has led to its racking up huge losses.
•

The National Housing Trust Fund (NHTF) is a compulsory provident scheme,

the proceeds of which can be used only for house purchase. The NHTF
was established under decree No 3. of 1992 and is designed to ensure
access by workers to housing finance. Self-employed workers and
employers of workers earning more than the minimum wage are required
to deduct 2.5 per cent of wages and pay the amount into the NHTF. The
accounts are held in the names of the individuals who should receive
annual statements. Contributions receive a rate of interest of 2.0 per cent.
By law, the Government and financial institutions are required to
contribute to the scheme. The contributions plus interest are repayable at
age 60 or on death. After contributing to the scheme for six months
workers are entitled to a mortgage loan of up to HS million (US$43,000) , at
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a rate of 6 per cent for 30 years. The loan is for a maximum of 90 per cent
of value, so the borrower needs to have a N500,000 (US$4,300) deposit.
The loan must be used for house purchase, house expansion, or building
on a plot which is owned.
This scheme is theoretically attractive to potential home buyers. After
saving just 2.5 per cent of their income for six months they can borrow H5
million (US$43,000) at an interest rate of 6.0 per cent, which compares with
an open market rate of 17 per cent, to buy a house at significantly below
market value. In addition, the house purchase is exempted from some
taxes.
However, the scheme has never, and will never, work as designed. The
amount raised through contributions is not sufficient to fund loans for more
than a tiny proportion of those eligible for loans. The scheme is in effect a
compulsory regressive tax: the majority of workers will never earn enough
to afford to buy a house. They are being forced to contribute part of their
income to a scheme, receiving a return well below the rate of inflation, to
finance cheap loans for the better off, most of whom are probably civil
servants. The recent changes (rate of interest cut from 9 to 6 per cent,
the loan ceiling increased from H1.5 million (US$ l 3,000) to HS million
(US$43,000), the maximum term increased from 25 to 30 years and
minimum borrower contribution reduced from 20 per cent to 10 per
cent) exacerbated the regressive nature of the scheme.
The scheme has also faced practical difficulties. A loan can be obtained
only if the borrower can produce clear title to the property he is buying.
This is impossible in the majority of states and accordingly no loans have
been made in those states. Loans can be made only through PMls and
there are no PMls in at least 10 states. In such cases a potential borrower
can apply to a PMI in another state, but it seems unlikely that this happens
to any significant extent. Many PMls do not qualify to distribute loans. The
FMBN will not disburse through a PMI more than 25 per cent of the PMl 's
capital , and it requires a bank guarantee for the loans it does disburse.
•

Primary Mortgage Institutions (PM/s) disburse subsidized loans financed by

the NHTF, and these are often combined with open market loans funded
by retail deposits. Their role is to collect retail deposits and to make
mortgage loans, both on the open market and as the only institutions
through which loans from the NHTF are distributed. However, they have
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low capitalization and poor governance. They are distrusted by the
public, which has meant that they have been unable to raise deposits.
Most PMls are very small, have made no loans at all and engage in
various real estate activities to keep themselves going. Some are owned
by the states. Most of the larger PMls are either subsidiaries of banks or
are connected with banks. The PMls currently serve little useful purpose.
The CBN closed down a large number of terminally distressed PMls in 1999
when they took over their supervision from FMBN. The poor quality of PMls
is illustrated by the fact that FMBN checks each loan application,
introducing further delay and cost into the system, because it cannot rely
on PMls' procedures. PMls are likely to lose out to the commercial banks
as they become increasingly involved in this area.
Some Suggestions
Phase 1 presents the priorities that are capable of being "quick wins" - essential
to put momentum Into the reform process. The recommendations are proposed
to be implemented within two years. These five recommendations can all be
implemented without legislative changes:

•

Substantially improve the transaction process by reducing the time taken
to achieve the necessary consents and reducing the costs from the
current level of 20-30 per cent of the value of the transaction to about 5.0
per cent. This is by far the most important single measure; if action is not
taken on this the other measures will not succeed.

•

Either abolish the NHTF or significantly reform it so as to redress the
balance between contributors and borrowers.

•

Substantially increase the capital requirement for PMls, and make loans
through the NHTF, if it is to continue, only to those that meet this and other
requirements.

•

Increase the capital base of the FMBN and develop its role as the source
of knowledge, statistics and expertise on the mortgage market, and
fac ilitator of market improvements.

•

Implement through the FMBN a simple mortgage liquidity facility which
would help pave the way for the use of covered bonds and mortgagebacked securities in the longer-term.
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Phase 2 measures are those that are not essenHal to sHmulate the market and
may take longer period to Implement due to the need for new leglslaHon. They
could be implemented over a five-year period. These are as follows:

•

Put in place arrangements through the FMBN that would allow covered
bonds and mortgage-backed securities to be issued. This may require
some legislative changes.

•

Reform the arrangements for foreclosure by one or both of improving
current processes within the current legal framework and by providing for
extra-judicial procedures.

•

Develop a mortgage insurance program in conjunction with a
commercial insurance company and facilitate common standards for
underwriting and documentation.

•

Remove the need for Governor's consent for land transactions, which will
entail changing the Constitution or persuading Governors to delegate this
power.

•

Introduce large-scale land registration programs and facilitate the
acquisition of title by existing occupiers of property.

•

Introduce comprehensive building codes and provide protection for
buyers of houses during the course of construction.

Expanding the Supply of Term Finance

Structural Weaknesses Hinder the Supply of Term Finance
The supply of term finance from private sources in Nigeria is extremely limited.
Without an adequate supply of term finance there are extremely limited
resources for projects, housing and infrastructure financing. Since SME and
housing finance have been addressed above, this section focuses on long-term
financing for infrastructure as poor infrastructure is both a cause and
consequence of Nigeria' s current economic challenges.
Infrastructure finance - a case study in securing term finance in Nigeria 11
Infrastructure requires a variety of sources of finance, depending on its scale and
complexity. For mega- and large-scale projects of national or transnational
11 A potential World Bank Project to support the development of PPPs for infrastructure in Nigeria has
been developed in consultation with FMOF and the Infrastructure Concession Regulatory Commission
(ICRC) and is currently awaiting National Assembly and Executive Council approval.
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scale, multi-national and large domestic commercial banks, investment banks,
international financial institutions (lfls) , and large international and domestic debt
and equity investment funds and facilities are all likely to have the asset bases.
For small- and medium-scale projects of local and regional scope, a different mix
of institutions is likely to be appropriate, including domestic commercial and
investment banks, domestic equity and debt funds and facilities, and pooled
lending facilities.
Core infrastructure requires reasonably priced, locally denominated, and longtenor capital. Sources of capital to meet such criteria are typically found in local
markets, but may also be accessed in international equity and debt markets,
particularly where cost-efficient, mid- to long-term foreign exchange hedging is
available, or when foreign exchange risk is borne by infrastructure service
beneficiaries through the project revenue stream (e.g., tariffs or taxes) . Nigeria
also has the option of tapping from IFI and bilateral donor assistance.
The recent international financial crisis has disrupted Nigeria's embryonic market
for domestic financing of infrastructure. Private appetite for infrastructure
investment is currently low due to such factors as short tenors for finance and high
cost of issuance and trading in the Nigerian equity market.12 In addition, the
limited capacity for origination and project development also constrains the
amount of financing deployed for infrastructure investment. In Nigeria, there is a
very thin and limited long-term financing market: the depth of the Nigerian bond
markets, which could offer the principal local source of long-term financing for
public infrastructure, is limited. The Federal Government bond market, while
growing and vibrant, only has a limited track-record. Domestic banks will,
however. need to build capacity to assess and manage long-term credit risk.
Similarly, pension and ongoing insurance reforms are encouraging growth in longterm savings as a natural source for long-term investment.
Structural bottlenecks to domestic term finance for infrastructure in Nigeria
include (i) the absence of a long-term pricing benchmark. (ii) the absence of
fixed-rate loans and securities, (iii) limited bank loan maturities, (iv) the absence of
a corporate bond market, (v) lack of secondary market liquidity, and (vi)
minimum rating and listing requirements for eligible investment by pension funds.
In addition, the capacity to assess, structure, and monitor infrastructure project
risks is severely limited across the commercial banking sector.

12 PPIAF. "Financial Institutions Appetite for Nigerian Core Infrastructure Financing in the Wake of
Global Rnancial Crisis: The Short. Medium and Long Terms." Draft. June 2009.

Radwan: Financial Sector Liberalization and the Challenges of Real Sector Financing in Nigeria

125

However, recent corporate bond issues suggest that investors - particularly the
developing pensions and insurance sectors - have demand for longer-term
securities. For banks, term lending remains difficult due to the structure of their
deposits, only 30 per cent of which are term deposits, and only a very small
proportion are for longer than one year. Depositors' reluctance to provide term
deposits reflects concerns about macroeconomic stability (inflation and
devaluation) as well as limited confidence in the banking system.
One measure which might help to address this problem would be the
development of active markets for interest rate swaps and foreign currency
hedging instruments so that banks could prudently finance term lending with
shorter-term liabilities and/or seek term financing in foreign currency which could
then be lent in Naira to Nigerian non-exporters. In March 2010, the Government
has moved to increase the supply of term finance for manufacturing, power, and
aviation by providing a ~00 billion of 10 to 15 year with 7.0 per cent fixed rate
on-lending facility from the Bank of Industry (banks will borrow funds at 1.0 per
cent to on-lend). The response to the launch of the W200 billion manufacturing
sub-component of this facility has been very successful (Wl 11 billion has been
released out of W130 billion that has so far been approved, with a further W90
billion in the process of approval). The take-up on this generously-priced longerterm funding has been impressive. The banks are given extra 'breathing space'
to restructure their loans rather than declare them non-performing. However, the
fiscal cost and potential distortions created by such favorable lending schemes
will be considerable.
Some suggestions
Given the size of Nigeria's infrastructure deficit (estimated at US$1 OObn) and the
limited nature of public resources, it is clear that tackling Nigeria's infrastructure
financing will require a successful public-private-partnership (PPP) model. There
are encouraging models of successful PPP projects in Nigeria, most notably the
MMA2 domestic air terminal and the Lekki Toll Road both in Lagos. These projects
indicate that Nigeria can successfully achieve this agenda. However, before
embarking on measures to address infrastructure financing challenges,
government must focus on developing the necessary skills and expertise required
to develop a pipeline of PPP projects, strengthen the legal and regulatory
framework for PPPs and then develop the necessary framework for project
implementation. As far as the financing of the identified projects is concerned, it
will be crucial to instill market confidence.
With this aim in mind it is
recommended that the authorities embark on the following reforms:
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Phase 1 to be implemented within the first 18 months include:
The institutional strengthening of SEC in the areas of regulation,
•
supervisory capacity and enforcement of intermediaries, collective
investments, and listed issuers.
•

The institutional strengthening and development of the supervisory
framework for the main market infrastructure institutions: the NSE and the

cscs.
•

Addressing regulatory weaknesses in selected priority topics: clearing
and settlement; corporate governance of issuers and the development
of the corporate bond markets.

Phase 2 to be implemented in 1.5 to 5 years include:
•

Institutional strengthening of SEC governance bodies and a more formal
implementation of a risk-oriented supervision model.

•

Improvement of the listing framework to increase the number of IPOs.

•

Implementation of the demutualization strategy and the clearing and
settlement model.

